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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the search theory has gained momentum, more attention has been paid to
flows into and out of unemployment, instead of concentrating on the stock of
unemployed. The matching model is one of the most popular models to analyze
the unemployment outflow. In this approach, the unemployment outflow into
employment is related to the number of unemployed and the number of vacancies
via a matching function. For an empirical analysis of the matching function,
see Pissarides (1986), Layard et al (1991), Blanchard and Diamond (1989,199O)
and van Ours (1991). A shortcoming of this standard matching approach is that
no account is being taken of employed job searchers. The group of employed
job searchers can be quite large and therefore exert a substantial effect on
the unemployment outflow rate. Recently, Burgess (1993) has developed a model
of competition between employed and unemployed job searchers in order to take
account of this effect. This competition h a s  h a d  c o n s i d e r a b l e  i m p a c t  o n
unemployment outflow, not only in Britain, but also in The Netherlands. Cf.
Broersma (1994).
In this paper, the model of competition is extended in order to take
account of yet another phenomenon, which has frequently been used to explain
differences in job opportunities between short-term and long-term unemployed,
namely discouragement. Here, we touch upon the notion that the duration of
unemployment affects the motivation and morale of the unemployed and also the
extend to which they are stigmatized by employers. Cf. Layard et al ( 1991).
In our view discouragement implies that the situation on the labour  market is
that bad, that long-term unemployed give up hope of finding a job and hence
stop searching. This phenomenon is particularly assumed to have happened in
t h e  e a r l y  80’s, when unemployment increased rapidly. We will present a model
that not only endogenizes competition between unemployed and employed, but
also endogenizes discouragement of long-term unemployed in the matching
approach.
Section 2 provides a theoretical framework with which the issues can
be understood. Section 3 presents some stylized facts on short-term and long-
term unemployment flows, while section 4 gives the empirical results. Finally
section 5 summarizes the main conclusions.
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2. A MODEL OF LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT OUTFLOW
Burgess’ (1993) model of competition serves as starting point. There are two
issues at stake here. First, employed job search, which is related to the
decision to search or not, when employed. This depends on the reservation
wage; a worker earning less will engage in search. Second, discouragement
among long-term unemployed, which is related to the labour  market conditions.
In grim conditions, long-term unemployed, for which we take the unemployed
with an unemployment duration of more than one year, may give up hope of
finding work and become discouraged. Short-term unemployed, i.e., with a
duration of less then one year, are assumed not to become discouraged.
It can be shown that the reservation wage, w, say, depends on all
parameters of the search problem and in particular on the arrival rate of job
offers, 8. If a worker is more likely to receive a job offer, search will be
more profitable. In other words, the reservation wage rises with increasing
0, % = 4e,w, where W is a vector of all other influences on the reservation
wage. Let #N be the proportion of the employed engaging in search, hence the
proportion earning less than w,.. Then
&V = @N(e,w), (1)
with #N increasing in its first argument.
Labour market conditions can be represented by the job offer arrival
rate 8. When labour  market conditions are bad, much less job offers will
arrive for long-term unemployed than in good times. In bad times, layoffs
increase implying an increase in short-term unemployed, U,, say. Hence, in
bad times, the long-term unemployed, Ur, will not only face competition from
employed job searchers, but also from an increasing number of short-term
unemployed. Of course, also in this case the number of discouraged long-term
unemployed searchers depends on the offer arrival rate 8 and on the variables
W as well. The more likely a long-term unemployed will receive an offer, the
less likely will he be discouraged. Let $q be the proportion of discouraged
long-term unemployed
4JL  = ~Lv,w.
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Here, eL is decreasing in the first argument: an increase in job offers, 8,
means t h a t  labour market conditions are favourable, so less long-term
unemployed become discouraged or & falls. We assume throughout that GN and
4L do not affect each other.
Clearly, 6 is an important variable in our model. It is given by
e = M/J, (3)
where M is the number of job matches and J is the number of job searchers,
which consists of the fraction of employed job searchers, &,N, the short-term
unemployed and the fraction of long-term unemployed not being discouraged.
Hence, all short-term unemployed are engaged in search, so J is defined as
J=q+,rN+U~+(l-~L)U, or dividing through the labour  force L
i =  us t  Ul + (l-U,-U,)@N  - &Ul. (4)
If there were no employed job search and discouragement, i.e. qN= 0 and @L= 0  ,
j would simply equal u = u,+ul and we would be back at the standard matching
model, where only unemployed search for a job. Equation (4) shows that the
movement in eN and @L are important in determining j and hence 8. But from
(1) and (2),  we found that 8 is also important for determining & and &.  In
fact, (1) through (4) jointly determine 8, & and &.
Following Burgess (1993),  we assume that individuals know the
unemployment rate at the beginning of the period, they form an expectation
about the matching or hiring rate m = M/L, and know that all other individuals
make a similar decision. In equilibrium, when expectations are fulfilled, we
then have
The properties of 8 are important for all three groups of job searchers.
We can next show that
-4-
1
rle,m =
l+TN~~  fl-=L%$  f
<  1, (6)
(7)
(8)
where fla,b is the elasticity of a with respect to b,  TN  is the proportion of
employed job searchers TN = (1 -u~--u~)@,I/~  and ;rrL  is the fraction of discouraged
long- term unemployed nL = ul@L/ j.
The elasticity r]e,m  in (6) states that an increase in the number of
matches m increases the offer rate 13 by less than one-for-one. The extend to
which Qe,,, lies below one depends on the importance of employed job searchers
(TN) and discouraged long-term unemployed (7~~)  and the responsiveness of
employed and long-term unemployed to changes in the job offer rate (q4# and
WLe3 respectively). Comparison between this situation and the one without
discouragement ( 7rL = 0 and veL,e = 0)) as studied in Burgess (1993), implies that
(6) yields an even lower value for ve,m than Burgess (1993), since q#,e ~0.  An
increase in the matching r a t e ,  m , stimulates employed job search, i .e. ,
raises && and lowers long-term unemployed discouragement, i.e., reduces GL,
thereby pushing ve,, considerably below unity. In a situation of absence of
both discouragement and competition ( 7rL  = TN  = 0 and qe,e  = r]@#  = 0), qe,,, = 1, which
is the standard result.
The elasticity ~8,~~  in (7) indicates that the offer arrival rate 8
also responds to changes in the number of short-term unemployed. Since Qe,U 3
is bounded between -1 and 0, this implies that an increase in u, lowers the
a r r i v a l  r a t e .  T h i s  r e f l e c t s  t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  n o t  o n l y  c o m p e t i t i o n
between employed and unemployed job searchers, but also between short-term
and long-term unemployed. This phenomenon describes the crowding out of
long-term unemployed by short-term unemployed. Since we have argued that
discouragement is connected to the situation on the labour  market represented
b y  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  l a y o f f s ,  i . e .  t h e  s h o r t - t e r m  u n e m p l o y e d ,  qe,U, g i v e s  a n
indication o f  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  d i s c o u r a g e m e n t  i n t h e  o u t f l o w  o f  l o n g - t e r m
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unemployed.
Next,  %,I$ reflects the responsiveness of the offer arrival rate to
the number of long-term unemployed. Only when both the share of employed job
searchers and the share of discouraged long-term unemployed are large, will
an increase in the long-term unemployed lead to an increase in the offer
arrival rate. In all other cases, -1 <q~,~r<O, so an increase in the long-term
unemployment rate lowers the job offer arrival rate. The three elasticities
(6)-(8) also relates the outflow rate of long-term unemployed, xl,  to m, u,
and q, respectively, since this outflow rate depends on the offer arrival
rate 0 in a positive way. We will return to this issue shortly.
Finally, we must examine whether employed, short-term and long-term
unemployed face the same offer arrival rates. There are two contradictory
opinions. Blau and Robbins  (1990) argue that employed generate more offers
per search. It is also argued that long-term unemployed search less efficient
compared to short-term unemployed. However, there is no apparent evidence for
that, although long-term unemployed are less likely to be called for an
interview. Cf.  Layard et al.  (1991). On the other hand, Mortensen (1986)
argues that unemployed search more intensively then employed. Therefore, we
assume the long-term unemployed to receive a proportion of offers given by
X,/M = WJrIJL 0 I XI 5 J/U,, (9)
where Xr  is the outflow from long-term unemployment. So long-term unemployed
receive more (less) than the ‘fair’ share of offers if XI  > 1 (XI  < 1).
The outflow rate from long-term unemployment, x1,  is the product of
the job offer arrival rate, 8,  and the proportion of offers accepted by the
long-term unemployed, ~1, times the share of offers the long-term unemployed
receive, hence
Xl = ww,~,,ul,w)~l. (10)
In this way the model can be developed in the same way as the model without
discouragement of long-term unemployed was derived. The difference is that
now not only employed, but also short-term unemployed exert influence on the
outflow rate from long-term unemployment.
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3. A MODEL OF SHORT-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT OUTFLOW
The model of the outflow rate for short-term unemployed is developed in the
same way as the model of competition between employed and unemployed job
searchers, as in Burgess (1993). We assume that short-term unemployed do not
become discouraged. Long-term unemployment does of course exert influence on
the outflow rate of short-term unemployed. The higher long-term unemployment,
the more job opportunities for short-term unemployed and hence the higher the
outflow rate. In that sense, discouragement of long-term unemployed favours
short-term unemployed. They only have to face competition from employed job
searchers. The outflow rate for short-term unemployed is then given by
% = vw,Us,~l,~)Ps. (11)
where X,  is the share of job offers received by short-term unemployed and ps
is the offer acceptance rate of short-term unemployed.
4. DATA
This section briefly discusses some of the data used. Details are presented
in the Data Appendix. Inflow from short-term to long-term unemployment in a
particular year t, is determined by the probability to stay unemployed in the
previous year t - 1, times the inflow in unemployment in t-  1. Outflow of
long-term unemployed is the difference of this inflow and the net change in
the stock of long-term unemployment. This outflow is normalized by the number
of long-term unemployed in the beginning of period t to yield the outflow
rate q,,.  We present the main characteristics of the long-term unemployment
stock and inflow and outflow in table 1. Figure 1 presents an outline of the
relevant flows. In figure 2, the actual long-term unemployment stock and flow
series are graphed.
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Table 1. Characteristics of long-term unemployment stock and flows, 1965-1991
Mean Standard deviation Maximum Minimum
Long-term unemployment 141,600 150 ,300 416,400 6,400
Inflow 118,700 78,000 258,500 23,600
outflow 107,800 73,600 262,700 23,900
Fiie 1. Flows into an out of unemployment.
NON-PARTICIPATION 1
Ir
F TFn,u lu,n
SHORT-TERM F :sir,  lu L O N G - T E R M I ’
UNEMPLOYMENT I UNEMPLOYMENT 1
F Tl F 1 Fe,u su,e lu,e
1 EMPLOYMENT 1
We will  pay specific attention to the flows out of long-term and
short-term unemployment, F,,,, and Far,e,  respectively. We have information
on the inflow into unemployment from employment and from non-participation
and abstract from the outflow of long-term unemployed to non-participation,
i . e .  F,,,, is set to zero. The discouraged long-term unemployed may be
considered as being non-participant, since they no longer search for a job.
We assume that there is no flow from short-term unemployment into non-
participation.
The inflow into (short-term) unemployment just consists of the flows
into unemployment from employment and from non-participation, F,,, and F,+,
respectively. The first flow is the number of layoffs, the second consists of
school-leavers and re-entrants on the labour  market searching for a job. We
can, however, say something about the outflow from short-term unemployment,
F mL,e3 which is determined by the difference between total and long-term
unemployment outflow. Over the sample period, short-term unemployment outflow
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is larger than long-term unemployment outflow. See figure 3.
Figure 2 reveals that until the 1980’s the inflow and outflow of
long-term unemployed moved close together, with an exception of 1975-76, when
the outflow fell.  In the early 80’s,  there was a dramatic increase in the
inflow of long-term unemployed, while at the same time the outflow decreased.
This led to a steep rise in the number of long-term unemployed from 1981-84.
After 1982, outflow rose again and after 1984 it was larger than inflow so
long-term unemployment slowly started decreasing. Especially in the period
1987-88, the outflow was large, so a considerable number of the long-term
unemployed found a job in that period.
Figure 3 also reveals some interesting features. The relatively mild
recessions of 1967 and 1972, were characterized by the fact that inflow rose
steeper than short-term outflow. If inflow into unemployment is a measure of
job destruction and (short-term) outflow is a measure of job creation, then,
in those years, jobs were destroyed at an increasing rate and jobs were being
created at an slightly less increasing rate. The more severe recessions of
1974-75 and 1980-82 were characterized by a sharp fall in short-term outflow.
Since job-to-job movement was minimal in those periods, we can say that there
has been a sharp fall in the creation of new jobs, combined with a large rise
in the number of jobs being destroyed. The outflow increased again from 1982
onwards. The period 1986-87 is characterized by large increases in both
inflow and outflow. This implies that large structural changes took place in
The Netherlands in that period. Cf. Broersma ( 1995).
The explanatory variables we use in the empirical modelling exercise
are described in detail in the Appendix. The hiring rate, m, is composed of
the number of workers moving from one job to another and the number of new
hires. In equation (lo),  A1  represents movements in the relative share of
offers and hence depends on search intensity and suitability of applicants,
for which we assume the replacement ratio’s, based on the benefits of short-
term and long-term unemployed to be important. Also the number of short-term
and long-term unemployed will affect &: more short-term unemployed imply a
declining share of job offers for long-term unemployed. Another factor which
might influence X,  is mismatch: unemployed offering ‘wrong’ skills in ‘wrong’
places. The variables in W that affect the job offer arrival rate 19  might be
the replacement ratio and demographic effects, like the proportion of young
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workers, aged 16-24, and the proportion of old workers, aged over 55. Young
workers are assumed to change jobs more often than older workers and hence
compete more with unemployed job searchers. We allow for non-linearity in 8
by including (log uJ2, (log u1)2,  (log mlog us) and (log mlog uI). The job
offer acceptance rate p depends on the relevant replacement ratio.
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
As in the analysis of Burgess (1993),  we assume that the actual matching or
hiring rate, 6, differs from its expected value by a zero mean random shock,
c, s o  Ga=m(l+<)  o r  logm=logm+e. Since the expected hiring rate m affects j,
the actual arrival rate is log8( m, us, ul, IV) + E. The expected matches m are
assumed to be determined by lagged matches. Starting with the outflow rate
out of long-term unemployment, we log-linearize (10) and incorporate the
random element in t9 to yield
1OgXi = 1OgXi t  logB(m,u,,ul,W) + lOgpi  +  E, (12)
where i =s for the outflow rate of short-term unemployed and i = 1 for the
outflow rate of long-term unemployed. We start with the model for the outflow
rate of long-term unemployed.
As a first stage we apply a unit root test to determine the degree
of integration of the series. The test suggests that all important series are
I( 1). Next, we test the presence of cointegration. A static regression of the
I(1) variables yields a Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.212, implying that the
presence of a long-run equilibrium relation cannot be rejected and that only
limited additional dynamics is needed to yield a model with no significant
residual autocorrelation. Model (12) can be rewritten in error-correction
form to give
where Z,, k=l,.., r is the set of explanatory variables and i = s,l. We do not
allow for lags in the integrated variables, due to the limited data set. Our
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modelling  approach is to move from general to specific and test whether our
model satisfies a number of important statistical properties, like absence of
autocorrelation, absence of non-normality and absence of heteroskedasticity.
The estimation results of (13) applied to long-term unemployment
outflow, after simplification, are presented in table 2. There is indeed
little additional dynamics required to yield a model free from residual
autocorrelation. The dynamic part of the model is confined to the change in
the square of the log of the long-term unemployment rate. This latter
variable is significant only at a 10 percent level and has a negative impact
on the outflow rate of long-term unemployed. Apparently, an increase in the
number of long-term unemployed job searchers only affects the outflow in the
short run. In fact, the outflow rate, xi, tends to decrease when long-term
unemployment increases. This negative value corresponds to the negative
elasticity of equation (8).
The long-run equilibrium part is, however, the more interesting part
of the model. Here we find the evidence of competition with employed job
searchers and with short-term unemployed. Both the adjustment parameter and
the parameters of logm, (logm4ogu,) and (log u,)* are highly significant.
There is also some slight influence of regional mismatch: the outflow rate is
negatively influenced by the fact that vacancies are offered in one place and
unemployed search for a job in another place.
The diagnostic tests point towards possible misspecification, as the
ARCH and RESET test statistics are rather high. This indicates that the
functional form is suspect. If we eliminated both the quadratic growth rate
of long-term unemployment and the regional mismatch indicator, which both
have a parameter value insignificantly different from zero at 5 percent, we
get the model of table 2, column 2.
In our model of the outflow rate of long-term unemployed, only the
error-correction part is important. This model cannot be rejected by any of
the diagnostic tests, so we find a stable long run relation between the
outflow rate of long-term unemployed, the matching rate and the short-term
unemployment rate. There is no significant effect of the level of long-term
unemployed on the outflow rate of long-term unemployed.
This outflow simply depends on the intensity with which employed and
short-term unemployed compete for a job, represented by the variables logn,
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(logmlogu,)  and (log us)?. Because of these non-linear effects, we have
non-constant elasticities. They are graphed in figures 4 and 5. Figure 4
corresponds to elasticity (6) and reflects the amount of competition between
employed job searchers and the long-term unemployed. In the first half of the
period, the hiring rate has had a negative effect on long-term unemployment
outflow. During that period, job-to-job movement was still considerable, so
long-term unemployed suffered a great deal of competition from employed job
searchers. In the first part of the 80’s, the industrialized world plunged
into recession and there was a dramatic decline in job-to-job movement. This
implied that there was less competition for the long-term unemployed, thereby
increasing their chances of finding employment and hence raising the outflow.
In the second half of the 80’s, labour  market conditions improved, job-to-job
movement increased, and the outflow of the long-term unemployed fell, leaving
the elasticity at a value near minus one.
Figure 5 corresponds to elasticity (7) and reflects the level of
discouragement of the long-term unemployed. In periods of economic distress,
represented by the number of layoffs, i.e. short-term unemployed, competition
with employed job searchers may fall, as job-to-job movement is low in these
circumstances. However, there is then increased competition from short-term
unemployed, looking for the few jobs that are being offered. Employers are
likely to prefer a short-term unemployed over a long-term unemployed to fill
a vacancy. This is a situation in which we assume that a long-term unemployed
may give up hope of finding a job and hence become discouraged. We find that
from the early 1970’s, there has been some discouragement among long-term
unemployed. Things worsened dramatically in the beginning of the 1980’s, when
huge amounts of workers were laid-off. When conditions on the labour  market
improved in the second half of the 80’s, more long-term unemployed were able
to find work and hence discouragement fell, and remained at a similar level
as the second part of the 70’s.
Note that the pattern in the elasticities of both figures moves in
opposite directions. Clearly, the elasticity of the outflow rate with respect
to short-term unemployment dominates. Therefore, the ‘discouragement’ effect
has been much higher over the reference period than the ‘hiring’ effect.
Table 3 contains the estimation and test results for the short-term
unemployment outflow, as specified by (13). A static regression of the I(1)
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variables yields a statistic of 1.695, implying that also in this case the
presence o f  a  l o n g - r u n equilibrium relation cannot b e  r e j e c t e d  a n d  t h a t
little additional dynamics is needed to yield an adequate model. After some
experimentation, (13) was simplified to the specification in the first column
of table 3. The adjustment parameter has a value of almost - 1. An F-test on
parameter restrictions gives F(2,20)  = 1.245, so our simplified mode l  i s
presented in the final column of table 3. As opposed to the long-term outflow
model, which had an adjustment parameter significantly different from - 1,
this short-term outflow model can be restricted to one where logx, is the
dependent variable. Diagnostic tests indicate that the ultimate specification
cannot be rejected at any reasonable significance level.
Also in this model the non-linear terms appear to be very important.
These variables are related to the intensity with which all three categories
of job searchers compete for the available jobs. Like the previous model, we
h a v e  n o n - c o n s t a n t  e l a s t i c i t i e s  i n  t h i s  m o d e l  a s  w e l l .  T h e i r  p a t t e r n s  a r e
plotted in figures 6-8. The hiring rate elasticity in figure 6 shows a value
of around 1 until the early 1980’s. After that it drops to about 0.5. The
explanation is again relatively straightforward. In the 1960’s and early
1970’s,  opportunities of finding a job for short-term unemployed were good,
despite competition with employed job searchers. In the second part of the
1970’s and early 1980’s, chances of finding a job were less, because of the
economic downturn. However, since job-to-job movement is procyclical, this
meant less competition with employed job searchers. During the same period,
long-term unemployment sky-rocketed and discouragement surged. This also
m e a n t  l e s s c o m p e t i t i o n  f o r  s h o r t - t e r m  u n e m p l o y e d .  I n  t h e  l a t e  1980’s,
however, the Dutch economy was booming, which raised job-to-job movement,
thus increasing competition with employed job searchers. Discouragement fell,
see figure 5. This means that there was considerable competition for short-
term unemployed. This competition appeared to be particularly fierce from the
part of the non-participants searching for a job. A majority of the increase
in employment in The Netherlands in the period 1985-1990 consisted of
non-participants and not unemployed. Cf. Ministry of Social Affairs (1993).
In figure 6, this is reflected by a permanently lower elasticity after 1984.
Figure 7 presents the outflow elasticity with respect to short-term
unemployment. This value is relatively constant and negative throughout, with
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a value around -0.9. The increase in layoffs due to the recession of 1981-2,
lowered the chances for short-term unemployed of finding a job. These chances
increased, however, during the subsequent upsurge. Note that this negative
value means that the outflow rate is negative, but not necessarily that the
outflow in persons is negative as well. In fact, in persons the elasticity
with respect to short-term unemployment is slightly positive.
Figure 8 shows the response of short-term unemployment outflow to
the long-term unemployment rate. This value is insignificantly different from
zero almost the entire reference period. There was a slight negative impact
throughout the 1970’s, whereas in the early 1980’s it was positive. The
recession of that period caused a steep rise in long-term unemployment and
discouragement. In its turn, this implied better opportunities of finding a
job for short-term unemployed, which explains the positive value. After that,
its value turns negative again, influenced by the economic upsurge.
6. COMPARISON WITH STANDARD MODELS
The final part of this paper is about a comparison between our models of the
previous section and the ‘standard’ matching model for long-term and short-
term unemployed job searchers. In these standard models, the number of
matches are determined by the stock of vacancies and the pool of unemployed.
This standard model typically has the form xi = f (v,  Ui)r i = s, 1, where v is the
vacancy rate. In essence, our model of competition and discouragement (12)
boils down to xi = 8(m,  u,,  uI), i = s,l. It is easy to show that this model can
also be expressed in terms of vacancies and unemployment.
Assume a matching function m equivalent to the standard form, given
by a Cobb-Douglas specification with constant returns to scale, n=iOL~l-S In
our setting of competition and discouragement, this means that
II
l-o!
Iliz  =e y=  5.
From the specification of the matching function, m, we can derive
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(14)
1V m -0l-. =
3 1 1i *
(15)
Substituting (15) into (14) then yields, using the matching function m,
(16)
In (16) the outflow rate for both short-term and long-term unemployed can be
written as a function of ratio of unemployment and vacancies and the ratio of
long-term unemployment and vacancies, or
%i = + tl-%-%)@N
V
_  @‘+-’  k+  (l;“)@N-  +l]-(l-a)or
*i = NV,U,Ul), = W(%%,Ul), i=S,l. (17)
Here, w is the reduced form model for the outflow rate of both short-term and
long-term unemployed that is derived from the simultaneous matching, competi-
tion and discouragement processes.
The matching model (17) for the outflow of long-term unemployed (i= I)
differs from the standard model in that not only the stocks of vacancies and
long-term unemployed determine the outflow of long-term unemployed, but also
the stock of short-term unemployed. An increase in this latter variable
decreases xl. Both xl = w(v, u,, ul)  and xl = O( m, u,, I+) are correct specifications
of the competition-cum-discouragement model. In essence, we find the same
reduced form model for the outflow rate of short-term unemployed (i = s). Also
in this case, both rd = O(  m, us, ul) and x, = w( v, us, ~1) are correct specifications
of the same process.
Since competition with employed job searchers and discouragement are
important features in the job search process for unemployed, we must compare
our results of tables 2 and 3 with the conventional approach. Hence, we first
have to specify and estimate these standard matching models. Table 4,
presents the estimation and test results of the standard models of short-term
and long-term unemployment outflow rates, based on ( 17). For both models, we
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have assumed a specification with constant returns to scale, which follows
from numerous matching function studies. See, Blanchard and Diamond (1989),
van Ours (1991),  Layard et al. (1991) and Burda and Wyplosz (1994).
The model for the outflow rate of long-term unemployed based on (17)
is presented in table 4, column 2. We find that the ratio of vacancies and
short-term unemployment (V/U,-ratio) has no effect on the outflow rate.
However, the ratio of vacancies and long-term unemployment (V/U,-ratio) does.
In fact, this model boils down to the standard matching model for long-term
unemployed, where the outflow of long-term unemployed is related to the stock
of long-term unemployed and the stock of vacancies. The elasticity of the
outflow rate with respect to long-term unemployment is -0.38. Note that in
combination with the fact that the dependent variable is the outflow rate,
i .e . , XlIVl, the elasticity with respect to the outflow in persons, Xl,  is
positive, with a value of 0.62, whereas in the model of table 2 its value was
insignificantly different from zero. This model did show a distinct effect of
short-term unemployment on the outflow of long-term unemployed, representing
the discouragement. In the standard model, we cannot find any influence.
c The outflow rate of short-term unemployed to employment is affected
by both the V/U, and the V/UI-ratio.  An increase in long-term unemployed
implies a decrease in the outflow rate of short-term unemployed. This
represents competition with long-term unemployed. On the other hand, an
increase in short-term unemployed rises the outflow rate of the short-term
unemployed, as could be expected from standard matching models. Also the
replacement rate influences the outflow of short-term unemployed. An increase
in the replacement rate means the reservation wage of unemployed increases,
so they have less incentive to accept a job offer as it arrives, which means
that the outflow rate falls. In this model, the elasticity of short-term
unemployment with respect to the outflow rate of equals -0.21, whereas in the
model of table 3 we found a non-constant elasticity of about -0.9. The
outflow in persons, X,, is positive with a value of 0.8 for the model of
table 4 and 0.1 for the model of table 3. The elasticity of the long-term
unemployment with respect to the outflow rate is -0.22, whereas for the model
of table 3 we found a non-constant elasticity of about -0.1. This implies
that even though models (12) and (17) represent the same phenomenon, the
elasticities are different.
- 16 -
The question is which of the models best fits to the data, our
preferred specifications in tables 2 and 3, or the equally suitable models of
table 4. To answer this question, we apply a number of encompassing tests to
assess whether our preferred models encompass the rival models. For more
details on the encompassing principle, we refer to Mizon and Richard (1986).
Basically, the encompassing principle boils down to the fact that when model
1 does not encompass model 2, there is specific data information contained in
model 2 not captured by model 1.
Table 5 presents the results of a number of encompassing tests. All
tests point towards the conclusion that the competition-cum-discouragement
model for the outflow rate of long-term unemployed job searchers encompasses
the ‘standard’ model of long-term unemployment outflow of table 4. The
encompassing tests for the short-term unemployment outflow model of table 3,
which incorporates competition with employed and long-term unemployed job
searchers, and the model of table 4, points towards the fact that the model
of table 3 encompasses the model of table 4. This evidence is, however, not
very strong. On the other hand, the results of these tests do emphasize the
importance of the job competition and discouragement variables in search
theory and matching functions.
Finally, we conduct a simulation experiment with our preferred model
specifications and the models based on (17) in order to infer the differences
in outflow into employment to an increase in labour supply. The outcome may
have policy relevance for The Netherlands. One of the major labour  market
problems in The Netherlands is the low participation rate. In essence, there
are two possible ways to increase labour participation, depending on the
assumption one makes on the cause of this low participation. It may be caused
by the fact that labour  supply is too low. The cure is then to stimulate
unemployed to search more actively. On the other hand, labour  demand may also
fall short. In that case stimulating labour  supply would not solve the
problem.
Table 6 presents the change in outflow, in number of persons, caused
by an increase in labour  supply, i.e., short-term or long-term unemployment;
which ever is relevant. We assume that an increase in either category leaves
the other category unaffected. The results of table 6 corroborate our earlier
analysis, namely that the models based of (12) and (17) are both correct
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representations of the same phenomenon. We find that the response of an
increase in short-term unemployment is about the same in the models based on
(12) and (17). In the model based on (12) this response is slightly lower. An
increase in long-term unemployment has virtually no effect on the outflow of
short-term unemployed in both models.
As far as discouragement is concerned, the table indicates that an
increase in short-term unemployment, representing an economic downturn, leads
to a fall in the outflow of long-term unemployed. Note that in the current
situation on the Dutch labour  market, this effect is twice as large as in an
equilibrium situation. The model specification based on (12) does not yield a
significant effect of long-term unemployment on the outflow of long-term
unemployed, whereas the model based on (17) does. Thus, for the outflow model
of long-term unemployed the simulation results of the two models cannot be
compared. Our preferred model specification, based on the encompassing tests,
does, however, represent the concept of discouragement, where an increase in
short-term unemployment leads to a decrease in the outflow of long-term
unemployed job searchers.
7. CONCLUDING REMARK!3
In this paper, we have presented a model which not only includes competition
between employed job searchers and unemployed, but also the phenomenon of
discouragement of long-term unemployed persons. Long-term unemployed become
discouraged when labour  market conditions are bad, thus the number of layoffs
increases, and they not only face competition of employed job searchers, but
also of an increasing number of short-term unemployed looking for the few
jobs being offered. In such a situation long-term unemployed give up hope of
finding a job and hence become discouraged.
Applying this model to annual data for The Netherlands over the
period 1965-1991, yields that long-term unemployment outflow rate has been
negatively affected by employed job search, with a possible exception of the
early 80’s, when job-to-job movement was low. Also short-term unemployment
outflow is affected by employed job search, but much less. Particularly, the
second half of the 1980’s, when on the job search was high, meant competition
- 18 -
for the short-term unemployed. From other sources we know that not only
employed looked for another job, but that a lot of the newly offered jobs
were filled by non-participants. This implies another source of competition,
which is beyond the scope of this paper.
More importantly, this model enables us to visualize the level of
discouragement of long-term unemployed. Discouragement started playing a
significant role in long-term unemployment outflow in the second half of the
70’s. Its effect increased dramatically in the early 80’s; from 1987 onwards
it is at approximately the same level as the second part of the 70’s. Another
important feature of this approach is that we find that a rise in the
participation rate, via increased job search through unemployment, does not
necessarily increase the unemployment outflow rate, especially of long-term
unemployed.
Finally, some policy recommendations may follow from our models.
First, in the short-term outflow model, the replacement ratio is an important
variable. A lower replacement rate increases the outflow out of unemployment.
A lower replacement ratio cannot only be achieved by lowering unemployment
benefits, but also by increasing the net wage rate. The latter amounts to
lowering the wedge. Both measures have already been proposed from a numerous
number of theoretical point of view. Hence, also the flow approach to labour
markets makes the same stance.
Second, discouragement of the long-term unemployed appears to play
an important role in The Netherlands, particularly in the first half of the
80’s when unemployment rose. So, measures to stimulate the job offer arrival
rate to this group may reduce discouragement and hence increase the outflow
of long-term unemployed to employment. There have already been made proposals
in The Netherlands to provide favourable conditions for employers, like tax
cuts, when a long-term unemployed is hired.
Third, low participation rates and a high level of unemployment,
especially of long-term unemployed, are the major labour  market problems in
The Netherlands. Our model shows that a policy to stimulate participation
through more incentives to search as an unemployed, e.g., by making it more
difficult for employees to enter the disability provisions, not necessarily
leads to more outflow of long-term unemployed to employment.
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Table 2. Estimation and test results of long-term unemployment outflow, based
on equation (12).
Dependent variable: Alog q t Alog XL t
constant 1.232
[1.427]
41~~~): -0.045
[-1.6381
1% q t-1 -0.645
[-5.1551
1% mt-1 4.075
[3.608]
(l%~+%%h-1 1.351
[3.572]
ewsL -0.236
[-2.688]
log mml,-1 -0.194
[-1.5831
1.232
[1.427]
-0.481
[-4.8691
3.605
[3.234]
1.299
[3.341]
-0.230
[-2.7311
R2
u
AR F(1,18)
AR x2(5)
Normality x2( 2)
ARCH F(1,25)
RESET F(1,18)
CHOW F(4,15)
0.666 0.564
0.234 0.254
1.109 0.036
5.530 3.240
1.935 0.833
2.580 0.325
2.616 2.554
1.163 0.688
The t-values are between square brackets, below the parameter values. AR
stands for testing absence of autocorrelated disturbances; it consists of the
F-version of the Lagrange Multiplier
X2-distributed  Ljung-Box test.
test due to Godfrey (1979) and the
Normality is tested by means of the Jarque and
Bera (1980) test. ARCH is tested with Engle’s (1982) test. Finally, we also
apply the familiar RESET test on functional form and omitted variables and
the Chow test on predictive performance of the model. The test statistics
indicate the null distribution and th2e degrees of freedom are presented in
parentheses with these statistics. R is the correlation coefficient, u is
the residual standard error.
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Table 3. Estimation and test results of short-term unemployment outflow,
based on equation (12).
Dependent variable: Alog %,t lws,t
-2.467
[-1.8411
1.120
[2.965]
-1.003
[ -5.0851
0.274
[0.322]
0.458
[5.946]
-0.521
[ -2.4791
-1.037
[-2.5821
-1.316
[ -2.3271
0.492
[8.649]
-0.336
t-3.9351
-0.672
[-4.8591
0.958
[3.567]
R2
u
AR F(1,18)
AR x2(5)
Normality x2( 2)
ARCH F(1,25)
RESET F(1,18)
CHOW F( 4,15)
0.799 0.968
0.154 0.150
0.270 0.267
1.910 4.760
0.231 1.710
0.250 1.551
0.326 0.700
0.885 0.559
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Table 4. Estimation and test results of ‘standard’ matching models for short-
and long-term unemployment outflow rates, based on equation (17).
Dependent variable: 1%  %I, t Alog  ~1,  t
constallt 0.199 0.080
Il.3721 [1.143]
1%  (U/%h
l%T-1
l%qt-l
0.208
[3.540]
-0.533
[-4.3591
l~f4wu~h-l 0.216 0.202
[6.709] [3.857]
R2
u
AR F(1,22)
AR x2(5)
N o r m a l i t y  x2(2)
ARCH F(1,25)
RESET F(1,22)
CHOW F(4,19)
0 . 9 6 0 0.453
0.165 0.272
0.191 0.163
2.560 3.090
1.259 1.960
1.781 0.399
0.035 2.005
0.938 0.759
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Table 5. Encompassing tests.
A. The model of long-term unemployment outflow, due to (12),  versus the same
model, due to (17).
The model of table 2 column 3 is called model 1
The model of table 4 column 2 is called model 2
model 1 vs. model2
-0.462
0.405
0.158
0.152
Form Test Form model 2 vs. model 1
*N(O,l) cox N(O,l) -3.117
N(0, 1) Ericsson IV NC&l) 2.501*
x2(1) Sargan x2(3) 4.830
F(L20) Joint Model F(3,20) 1.772
B. The model of short-term unemployment outflow, due to (12),  versus the same
model, due to (17).
The model of table 3 column 1 is model 2
The model of table 4 column 1 is model 2
model 1 vs. model2 Form Test Form model 2 vs. model 1
-2.317 * N(O,l) cox NC&l) -3.875 *
1.736 N(0, 1) Ericsson IV NC’&  1) 2.619*
3.059 x2(3) Sargan x2(4) 7.065
1.023 F(3,16) Joint Model F(4,18) 2.129**
* **
indicates significance at a 5 percent and at a 10 percent level.
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Table 6. Simulation results. The change in the outflow (in 1000 persons) from
the two unemployment duration classes due to a 1 percentage point
increase in the short- and long-term unemployment rates for two
baseline projections’).
Baseline 12) Baseline 23)
Effect of a shock in Effect of a shock in
Ui: Us Ul Ui: us Ul
on the outflow of
U, model (12) 57 0 23 0
model ( 17) 60 -1 25 -1
U, model ( 12)4) -2 -1
model (17) 39 - 21
‘) The - indicates that, there is a theoretical effect, but that it is
insignificantly different from zero.
2, In baseline 1, which is related to the Current Dutch situation, we have
set N=5000,  U=600, U,=300,  lJ,=300,  X=500, Xs=300,  .X,=200.
3, In baseline 2, which is a more or less equilibrium situation derived from
the situation in the early 1970’s, we have set N = 4000, lI= 400, Us= 330, U,=70,
X = 240, X, = 180, X, = 80.
4, The response of this model to a shock in short-term unemployment is a
measure of discouragement of long-term unemployed job searchers.
- 24 -
Figure 2. Long-term unemployment: stock and flows in The Netherlands
1965-1991 (stock: left scale, flows: right scale).
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Figure 5. Short-term unemployment elasticity, with 2 standard error
boundaries, of the model of long-term unemployment outflow.
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APPENDIX. DATA
Abbreviations
CBS: Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics
CPB: Netherlands Central Planning Bureau
OECD: Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
Definitions and sources
q:
x,:
outflow rate out of long-term unemployment: XI/U,,-,
the outflow of the number of long-term unemployed.
Xr  is calculated as
4 = L,tu - Ah,
w h e r e  F,,,, is the inflow into long-term unemployment, which is
calculated as the product of last periods probability of remaining
unemployed for more than one year and the total unemployment inflow
of the previous period, hence
FSUJU = Pr-,(U>  1 year)Ui,,-t
Pr(U>  1 year) can be calculated from unemployment duration figures,
where the number of unemployed with duration 12-24 months in period
t is divided by the number of unemployed with duration O-12 months
in period t-l.
source: CBS,  So&ale  maandstatistieken
Ministry of Social Affairs, unpublished series.
the inflow into unemployment, which consists of inflow of the number
of persons receiving unemployment insurance benefit (WW) and inflow
of persons on unemployment support (RWW). Or: the inflow from non-
participation ( Fn,J  and employment (F,,,).
The inflow of persons receiving an unemployment insurance benefit is
directly observable.
source: Sociale  Verzekeringsraad, Kroniek van de sociale  verzekeringen,
1992.
The inflow of persons into unemployment support is approximated by
half the flow of school-leavers. See also Broersma ( 1994).
source: CBS, Het onderwijs vanaf 1950
CBS, Stat&is&  Jaarboek, 1992, 1993.
Ministry of Social Affairs, Rapportage Arbeidsmarkt.
u,: the number of unemployed job searchers with an unemployment duration
of more than one year
source: van Ours (1991).
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Y,:
X,:
x:
u,:
u:
E:
q:
u,:
m:
H:
F out:
J J :
l-l-:
CPB, Lange reeksen.
outflow rate out of short-term unemployment: X,/U,,-i
outflow of the number of short-term unemployed into employment,
calculated as X, = X-X,.
outflow rate out of total unemployment: X = Uj,- AU.
the number of unemployed job searchers with an unemployment duration
of less than one year. This is calculated as U, = U-U,.
the number of unemployed job searchers.
sonrce: CPB, Lange reeksen.
total employment in 1000 persons
source: CPB, Lange reeksen.
long-term unemployment rate: U,/( E + U)
short-term unemployment rate: U,/(  E + U)
hiring rate: (H+ JJ)/(E-,+U-,),
the gross inflow into employment, save job-to-job movers, calculated
as H=AE+F,,.
persons moving from employment to unemployment and non-participation
source: Broersma (1995)
the number of employed persons moving from one job to another.
source: Hartog et al. (1988)
CBS,  Arbeidskrachtentelling
Ministry of Social Affairs, Kwartaalbericht Arbeidsmarkt
and author’s own calculations.
replacement ratio, defined as the weighted average of the weekly net
unemployment insurance benefit and the weekly unemployment support
benefit, divided by the average weekly net pay in manufacturing
source: Sociale  Verzekeringsraad, K r o n i e k  v a n  d e  so&ale v e r z e k e r i n g e n ,
1992.
CBS, 80 jaar statistiek in tijdreeksen.
CBS,  Sociaal- economische maandstatistiek 1993.
Ministry of Social Affairs, Rapportage arbeidsmarkt.
mml: regional mismatch index of the eleven Dutch provinces.
It is calculated as the absolute value of the forecast error of the
individual W-curves, hence
- 34 -
source: CBS, Sociaal  - economische maandstatistiek.
CBS, Statistisch Zakboek.
m m 2 : sectoral  mismatch index for six Dutch sectors, due to Lilien (1982).
It is calculated as
mm2 = {C~,i(Ei/E)[Alo@i  - Al~gZi’]*}“.
source: calculated from CBS, Statistisch Zakboek.
Ei: employment in six sectors in The Netherlands.
source: CBS, sociaal- economische maandstatistiek.
(1624: fraction of employed persons between 16 and 24 years old.
source: calculated from CBS, Statistisch Zakboek.
&64: fraction of employed persons between 55 and 64 years old.
source: calculated from CBS, Statistisch Zakboek.
+25: ratio of unemployed below 25 and employed below 25.
source: calculated from CBS, Statistisch Zakboek.
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